Non-local boxes are hypothetical "machines" that give rise to superstrong non-local correlations, leading to a stronger violation of Bell/CHSH inequalities than is possible within the framework of quantum mechanics. We show how non-local boxes can be used to perform any two-party secure computation. We first construct a protocol for bit commitment and then show how to achieve oblivious transfer using non-local boxes. Both have been shown to be impossible using quantum mechanics alone.
Introduction
Consider two parties, Alice (A) and Bob (B), who are not able to communicate but have access to physical states that they can use to generate joint correlations. The generation of correlation can be regarded as an experiment in which both parties decide to measure the state of their system, and the outcomes of their measurements are given by random variables. Classical as well as quantum theories put limits on non-local correlations that can be generated between separated sites when no communication is available. In particular, both classical and quantum theories do not violate the no-signaling condition of special relativity, i.e., the local choice of measurements may not lead to observable differences on the other end. The limits on the strength of correlations generated in the framework of any classical theory (i.e. a theory based on local hidden variables) are known as Bell inequalities [1] . A well-known variant of a Bell inequality is the Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt (CHSH) inequality [4] x,y∈{0,1}
Pr(a x + b y ≡ x · y) ≤ 3.
Here x ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} denote the choice of Alice's and Bob's measurement and a x ∈ {0, 1} and b y ∈ {0, 1} the respective dichotomic outcomes. The theory of quantum mechanics allows the violation of this inequality, but curiously only up to a maximal value of 2 + √ 2 which is known as Cirel'son's bound [3] . Since special relativity would even allow a violation of Cirel'son's bound, Popescu and Rohrlich [17] , [18] , [19] raised the question why nature is not more 'non-local' ? That is, why does quantum mechanics not allow for a stronger violation of the CHSH inequality, up to the maximal value of 4? To gain more insight into this question, they constructed a toy-theory based on non-local boxes. Each such box takes inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} from Alice and Bob respectively and always outputs measurement outcomes a x ,b y such that x · y = a x ⊕ b y . Note that Alice and Bob still cannot use this box to transmit any information. However, since for all x and y, Pr(a x +b y ≡ x·y) = 1, the above sum equals 4 and thus non-local boxes lead to a maximum violation of the CHSH inequality.
Classical as well as quantum mechanics do not allow for the construction of unconditionally secure bit commitment and oblivious transfer without additional assumptions [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] . Thus it is a fundamental problem to assess whether any theory that generates correlations renders these cryptographic primitives possible, while simultaneously preserving the no-signaling constraint of special relativity. In this paper, we show that two parties with access to the primitive of non-local boxes as described above are indeed able to perform unconditionally secure bit commitment as well as one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (1-2 OT).
A bit commitment protocol allows Alice and Bob to perform the following task: Alice has chosen a bit b, and wants to convince Bob that her choice is made without revealing the actual value of b. Since Bob is inherently mistrustful, Alice sends him some piece of evidence that she made up her mind. However, Bob still has insufficient information to obtain b. Later on, Alice tells Bob her choice b ′ and Bob verifies that Alice is honest (b ′ = b) using the piece of evidence from Alice. The problem of oblivious transfer was introduced by Rabin [20] . The variant of 1-2 OT first appeared in a paper by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [8] and also, under a different name, in the well-known paper by Wiesner [25] . 1-2 OT allows Alice and Bob to solve a seemingly uninteresting problem: Alice has two bits s 0 and s 1 . Bob wants to learn one of them, but does not want to disclose to Alice which bit he is interested in. However, Bob should also be restricted to learning only one of Alice's inputs. It turns out that given 1-2 OT we can perform any kind of two-party secure computation [10] .
It has been understood for a long time that noisy channels and preshared noisy correlations are sufficient to implement secure two-party computations, via 1-2 OT. Kilian [11] has shown that noisy "cryptogates" (primitives with inputs and outputs for each of the two players) can generically be used to implement 1-2 OT. Based on the techniques of that paper one would expect that non-local boxes would permit 1-2 OT, since they provide some intrinsic noise. This is indeed the case, but for more subtle reasons, as we shall discuss in the present paper.
We would also like to draw the readers attention to a paper by van Dam [24] , [23] who shows that access to perfect non-local boxes allows Alice and Bob to perform any kind of distributed computation by transmitting only a single bit of information.
Related Work
Recently Wolf and Wullschleger [26] suggested that 1-2 OT can be constructed using one nonlocal box alone. However, their version of 1-2 OT implicitly assumes that the non-local box acts as a kind of cryptogate: it either has to simply wait until both players provide their input until it produces output, or its use is timed in the sense that the protocol will demand an input at a certain moment, and if a player doesn't supply one, substitutes a standard input (say, 0). Notice that the first possibility runs somewhat counter to the spirit of the concept of non-local boxes, as it would allow signaling by delaying or not delaying an input. The whole point of non-local boxes is that they cannot be used to signal in either direction. That this assumption of synchronous input/usage of the box is vital to the result of Wolf and Wullschleger, can be seen easily, as follows: without it, Bob can delay his choice of the selection bit indefinitely by simply deferring his use of the non-local box. This makes an important difference in reductions to 1-2 OT. Consider for example, the simple reduction of OT to 1-2 OT (see Section 2.2 for definitions): The sender uses inputs s k = b and sk = 0 with k ∈ R {0, 1}. The receiver uses input c ∈ {0, 1}. They now perform 1-2 OT(s 0 , s 1 )(c) after which the receiver holds s c . Then the sender announces k. If k = c, the receiver succeeded in retrieving b and otherwise he learns nothing. This happens with probability p = 1/2 and thus we have constructed OT from one instance of 1-2 OT. Clearly, this reduction fails if we use 1-2 OT based on non-local boxes as suggested in [26] . The receiver simply waits for the announcement of k to retrieve b with probability p = 1. This was noticed independently by Short, Gisin, and Popescu [22] . However, the protocol of Wolf and Wullschleger forms a useful basis for our construction of 1-2 OT in Section 4.
This Work
Here, we show how to circumvent the problem of delay and construct a protocol for bit commitment and 1-2 OT based on non-local boxes. This shows that superstrong non-local correlations would not only allow us to perform any problem of distributed computation using only a single bit of communication, but it would also enable us to solve cryptographic problems otherwise known to be impossible. This creates a link between cryptographic problems, which are seemingly very artificial, and non-locality.
Outline
The rest of the present paper is structured as follows. Necessary notation and definitions are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents a protocol for bit commitment based on non-local boxes. Finally, in Section 4, we show how to obtain 1-2 OT using the same type of boxes.
Preliminaries

Notation
Throughout this text, we say "Alice picks x" for Alice chooses x independently at random from the uniform distribution over all strings of a certain length. We write [n] for {1, . . . , n}. We write y ∈ R S if y is chosen uniformly at random from S. In addition, we use x · y to denote the inner product i=1,...,n x i · y i mod 2 between strings x = x 1 . . . x n and y = y 1 . . . y n from {0, 1} n . Furthermore, for strings x ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} * we define | · | 11 recursively: For the empty word ǫ define |ǫ| 11 = 0. For a, b ∈ {0, 1} and strings x ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} * define |abx| 11 = |x| 11 +1 if ab = 11 and |abx| 11 = |x| 11 otherwise. Informally, |x| 11 is the number of substrings "11" in x starting at an odd position.
Model and Definitions
Throughout this text, we call the participant in a protocol honest if he follows the protocol. Since we are only interested in the case of unconditional security, a dishonest participant is not restricted in any way. In particular, he may lie about his own input, perform alternate actions during the course of the protocol, or even abort the protocol completely.
Non-local Boxes
A non-local box (NL Box), sometimes also referred to as Popescu-Rohrlich box can be seen as a two-party primitive, generating correlations [17] .
Definition 1 A non-local box (NL Box) is a two-party primitive between Alice and Bob, where
Alice inputs x ∈ {0, 1} and immediately obtains outcome a ∈ {0, 1} and Bob inputs y ∈ {0, 1} and immediately obtains outcome b ∈ {0, 1} such that the following holds:
• Once Alice inputs x ∈ {0, 1}, she immediately receives outcome a ∈ {0, 1},
• Once Bob inputs y ∈ {0, 1}, he immediately receives outcome b ∈ {0, 1},
Observe that the last condition implies that these boxes cannot be used to signal, because the outcome of a is independent of x and y and also b is independent of x and y. It is worth mentioning that specifying the statistics of the primitive as we did, and disregarding the fact that outputs are obtained immediately after giving a local input, a non-local box is simply a special bidirectional channel, as proposed by Shannon [21] . Of course, in general such channels cannot give an output immediately without having both inputs; non-local boxes can, because they have no signaling capacity. Observe furthermore that the behaviour described in the definition parallels quantum mechanical experiments on entangled states: the outcomes are correlated in a way reflecting the measurement settings, but each experimenter obtains his outputs immediately.
Note that both Alice and Bob can wait indefinitely before providing their input to the NL Box. Once they use the box however, they will only obtain an outcome in accordance with the condition given above. We say that Alice or Bob delay the use of their box, if they wait more time than a given protocol dictates before providing their input to the NL Box.
Bit Commitment
Bit commitment is a well known cryptographic primitive that plays an important role in many other cryptographic protocols. Informally, it is defined as follows: We say that Alice cheats if she chooses a bit c ′ only after the commit phase and tries to get Bob to accept c ′ during the reveal phase. We also say that Alice cheats successfully, if Bob accepts the chosen c ′ . Furthermore, we say that Bob cheats if he tries to obtain c before the reveal phase. Bob cheats successfully if he obtains the correct c before the reveal phase. Note that our protocol for bit commitment is probabilistic and thus achieves statistical security for a security parameter n. We have that if Alice tries to reveal a bit c ′ = c, Bob rejects with probability p = 1 − ε n for some 0 ≤ ε < 1. Likewise, the probability that Bob correctly guesses bit c before the revealing stage is p ≤ 1/2 + (ε ′ ) n for some 0 ≤ ε ′ < 1. By choosing n large we can get arbitrarily close to the ideal scenario.
Oblivious Transfer
Different versions of oblivious transfer exist in the literature. We will here be concerned with one of the most simple forms of oblivious transfer, namely 1-2 OT. • (Security against Alice) If Bob is honest, Alice does not learn c.
• (Security against Bob) If Alice is honest, Bob does not learn anything about sc.
Again, our protocol here is probabilistic and achieves statistical security for a security parameter n. The probability that Bob learns anything about sc is p ≤ ε n for some ε < 1. Similarly, the probability that Alice correctly guesses c is upper bounded by 1/2 + (ε ′ ) n for some 0 ≤ ε ′ < 1.
As we saw in Section 1.1, the fact that Alice and Bob can wait before using an NL Box can have an effect on cryptographic reductions. In our example, we made use of the most simple form of oblivious transfer, which is equal to an erasure channel.
Definition 4 Oblivious transfer (OT) is a two-party protocol between Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver), such that the following holds:
• If both Alice and Bob are honest, the protocol depends on Alice's input bit b ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol, Bob obtains b with probability 1/2 and knows whether he obtained b or not.
• (Security against Alice) If Bob is honest, Alice does not learn whether Bob obtained b.
• (Security against Bob) If Alice is honest, Bob's probability of learning bit b does not exceed 1/2.
BC from NL Boxes
We now give a bit commitment protocol based on (perfect) non-local boxes. Our protocol consists of k blocks. In each block the parties share 2n + 1 non-local boxes. We later fix the parameter n such that we have sufficient security against Bob.
One Block
1-commit(c)
• Alice wants to commit to bit c. She chooses x ∈ {0, 1} 2n+1 by randomly choosing the first 2n bits and then choosing x 2n+1 ∈ {0, 1} such that |x 1 . . . x 2n | 11 + x 2n+1 + c is even.
• Alice puts the bits x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 2n+1 into the boxes 1, 2, . . . , 2n + 1. Let a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 2n+1 be Alice's output bits from the boxes.
• Alice computes the parity of all these output bits A = ⊕ 2n+1 i=0 a i and sends A to Bob.
• Bob randomly chooses a string y ∈ R {0, 1} 2n+1 and and puts the bits y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y 2n+1 into his boxes. We call his output bits from the boxes b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b 2n+1 .
1-reveal(c)
• Alice sends c, her string x and all her 2n + 1 output bits to Bob.
•
Define C(x) to be the bit which is encoded by x. If Alice is honest, C(x) = c. It will be clear from our analysis in section 3.1, that if Alice cheats in one block of the protocol Bob will notice this in the reveal phase with probability 1/4. To increase this probability, we can do many rounds of this protocol. If Alice and Bob run the full protocol NLBC(c) with k rounds, then the probability that Bob catches a cheating Alice becomes larger. In fact, in a k block protocol, the probability that Alice cheats successfully is (3/4) k . Unfortunately, Bob learns a little bit about the committed bit in each block. However, in the analysis we show that the amount of information Bob learns in each block can be brought down to (almost) zero.
Security against Alice
Let us first analyze the security against a cheating Alice for one block only. We show that no matter which cheating strategy Alice uses she is always detected with probability at least 1/4. There are three cases for Alice's cheating strategy:
1. She has input something into all her boxes after the commit phase. If she wants to reveal a bit different from C(x) (for the originally chosen x), she needs to change at least one of her x i . If she does not change the corresponding output bit a i and y i = 1 she will be caught. If she changes a i but y i = 0 she will be caught. Because Pr[y i = 1] = Pr[y i = 0] = 1/2 she is detected with probability at least 1/2.
Alice delays input to some boxes after the commit phase, but all boxes have inputs before the reveal phase.
Assume Alice sends bit A ′ to Bob in the commit phase, pretending it was the parity of her a i 's. She now wants to reveal. Since the outputs of her delayed boxes are completely random to her, with probability 1/2 the parity of all a i 's will be different from A ′ . Thus, in this case she has to change at least one a i . But if y i = 0 (y i = 1) and Alice does (does not) change x i , she is caught. Thus, Alice is detected with probability at least 1/4.
After the reveal phase not all boxes have an input. Assume that Alice does not use box
i at all and pretends that x i and a i were her input and output bit for the i-th box, respectively. Let a ′ i be the output bit she would have got, if she had input x i into the i-th box, i.e. a ′ i ⊕ b i = x i · y i . Note that a ′ i is completely independent of all of her variables and P r[a ′ i = 1] = P r[a ′ i = 0] = 1/2. Thus, with probability 1/2 Bob catches Alice cheating. We now show that there is a cheating strategy for Alice, such that she is only detected with probability 1/4, if at least 3 boxes are used per block: She first sends a random bit A to Bob in the commit phase and does not input anything into her boxes. In the reveal phase she chooses x ∈ {00}{0, 1} 2n−1 with C(x) = c ′ , where c ′ is the bit she wants to reveal. Then she puts the x i 's into her boxes. With probability 1/2 the parity of the outputs a i from the boxes is equal to A. Then she is fine and proceeds with the protocol as she was supposed to. If not she flips the bits x 1 and a 1 and then goes on with the protocol as normal. Now, the parity of the output bits is indeed equal to the A she send before and the x-string still encodes c ′ . The changes are detected by Bob iff y 1 = 0. If Bob is honest we have Pr[y 1 = 0] = 1/2. Thus, a cheating Alice, using the above strategy, is detected by an honest Bob with probability 1/4. Now, assume that Alice and Bob do a k-block protocol. If Alice wants to cheat, she has to cheat in each block. In each block she is detected with probability (at least) 1/4. Bob will accuse her of cheating if he catches her cheating in at least one block. Thus, a cheating Alice is detected by Bob with probability at least 1 − (3/4) k . We set the number k of blocks such that this number is sufficiently close to 1.
Security against Bob
Let us now analyze the security against a cheating Bob. We first want to prove that Bob cannot learn too much in one block. Bob can base his guess for c on the output of his boxes and the bit A he receives from Alice. Note that after Bob has received the bit A, he learns the inner product of x and y because
We now want to argue that this is all Bob learns about x (and therefore c). In the trivial case y = 0 2n+1 it is easy to see that Bob learns nothing, because his output bits b i are uniformly random and the bit A he receives does not contain any information since A = 2n+1 i b i . For that reason we will not consider the case y = 0 2n+1 in our further analysis.
Assume now Bob chooses y ∈ {0, 1} 2n+1 \{0} 2n+1 . Furthermore, assume that Alice and Bob follow the above protocol, but this time Alice does not commit to a bit but rather chooses a uniformly random string x ∈ {0, 1} 2n+1 . First note that as above Bob still learns x · y. Since |{x : x · y = 1}| = |{x : x · y = 0}|, x · y contains exactly one bit of information about x. But also, since the boxes are non-signaling and Alice only sends one bit, Bob can learn at most one bit of information about x. Therefore, the only thing Bob learns about x is x · y. Since in this changed protocol Bob learns precisely x · y, also in the original protocol Bob learns precisely x · y and nothing else.
The following lemma can be used to upper bound Bob's information gain in one block.
Lemma 1 Assume Alice and Bob do one block of the protocol with 2n + 1 NL boxes, where
Bob chooses some y ∈ {0, 1} 2n+1 \{0} 2n+1 and Alice commits to some c ∈ {0, 1}. Then the probability for x · y = c, averaged over all x ∈ C −1 (c) is bounded by
Proof. We write p c y as a shorthand for Pr x,C(x)=c [x · y = c]. The proof is by induction on n. For n = 0 the statement is easily seen to be true. Assume now n > 0. Let y 1 , y 2 be the first two bits of y and y ′ the rest, i.e. y = y 1 y 2 y ′ . To explain the argument, let us for instance look at the case y 1 y 2 = 01. For any x ′ ∈ {0, 1} 2n−1 we have Let us now analyze a k-block protocol, where for simplicity k is even. We only consider the case where Alice commits to c = 0 and c = 1 each with probability 1/2.
Lemma 2 Assume Alice and Bob do a k-block protocol in which in each block 2n + 1 boxes are used. Then the probability that Bob guesses the committed bit correctly is upper bounded by
Proof. Let r i be Bob's best guess for c using only x · y from the i-th block. Set ǫ i such that 1/2 + ǫ i = Pr[c = r i ]. By Lemma 1, 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2 n+1 . Note that Bob's only information about c is r 1 , . . . , r k .
Let us think of the process of how r i is obtained in a way which is easier to analyze but equivalent to the original: With probability 1 − 2ǫ i (a) the bit r i is chosen randomly from {0, 1} and with probability 2ǫ i (b) r i is set to c.
By the union bound the probability that at least once during the k blocks case (b) occurs is at most k i=1 2ǫ i ≤ k2 n . Thus, with probability at least 1 − k/2 n the bits r 1 , . . . , r k are completely random and Bob's probability of guessing correctly is upper bounded by
2 Note that the analysis in Lemma 2 is not tight, but sufficient for our purposes.
1-2 OT from NL Boxes
We now show how to construct 1-2 OT from NL Boxes. We thereby assume that Alice and Bob have access to a secure bit commitment scheme BC as given in Section 3 for sufficiently large k. Our protocol extends the protocol suggested by Wolf and Wullschleger [26] and uses an idea presented in the context of quantum oblivious transfer by Crépeau [5] , [6] and Crépeau and Kilian [7] .
Protocol
Before presenting the actual protocol, we briefly discuss the intuition behind it. The rough idea is that using NL Boxes, we can approximate an erasure channel from Alice and Bob: Suppose Alice has input v ∈ {0, 1}. She picks y ∈ R {0, 1}, sets r y = v and picks rȳ ∈ R {0, 1}. If Alice inputs x = r 0 ⊕ r 1 and Bob inputs y ′ ∈ R {0, 1} to an NL Box they will obtain outputs a and b with a ⊕ b = x · y ′ . If Alice now sends m = r 0 ⊕ a to Bob, Bob will obtain r y ′ by computing m ⊕ b = r 0 ⊕ a ⊕ b = r 0 ⊕ (r 0 ⊕ r 1 )y ′ = r y ′ . He cannot obtain more than one bit of information, as he receives only one bit of communication from Alice. Now Alice announces y to Bob. If y = y ′ , Bob received Alice input bit r y ′ = v. This happens with probability 1/2. The only trick we need, is to make sure Bob actually did use the Box and made his choice of y ′ before Alice's announcement. To achieve this, bit commitment is used in step 2. • Alice picks r 0,i , r 1,i ∈ R {0, 1}.
• Bob picks y ′ i ∈ R {0, 1}.
• Alice and Bob use one NL Box with inputs x i = r 0,i ⊕ r 1,i and y ′ i respectively. Alice gets a i , Bob b i .
2: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Bob runs commit(y
• Alice picks k i ∈ R {0, 1}, and announces it to Bob.
• Bob runs reveal(y • Alice checks that x i+ki n · y ′ i+kin = a i+kin ⊕ b i+kin and otherwise aborts the protocol.
• Alice sets r 0,i ← r 0,i+ki n , r 1,i ← r 1,i+kin and a i ← a i+kin . Bob sets b i ← b i+kin and y
• Alice sends m i = r 0,i ⊕ a i to Bob.
• Bob computes v
• Alice picks y i ∈ R {0, 1}, sets v i = r yi,i and announces y i to Bob. 
Correctness
We first need to show that if both parties are honest, Bob succeeds in retrieving s c with high probability. Note that Bob can retrieve s c , if he can construct a set J c ⊂ [n] with |J c | = n/3 where ∀i ∈ J c , y i = y ′ i , since only then ∀i ∈ J c , v i = v ′ i and he can computê
We are thus interested in the probability of Bob constructing such a set successfully. Let X i be the random variable such that X i = y i ⊕ y ′ i . Note that since Alice and Bob choose y i and y ′ i independently uniformly at random, the random variable S n = n i=1 X i is binomially distributed. From Hoeffding's inequality [9] we obtain
Then, Pr(Bob gets s c ) = Pr #{i|y i = y
where the last inequality comes from equation (1) . Thus the probability of Bob failing is exponentially small in n.
Security against Alice
First of all, suppose that Bob is honest, but Alice tries to learn c. As outlined in Section 2, NL Boxes do not allow signaling and therefore Alice learns nothing during step 1 of the protocol. Due to the concealing properties of the bit commitment scheme, Alice information gain in step 2 is negligible for a sufficiently large security parameter k. Thus the only time she receives information from Bob is during step 4. Note that Bob picks y ′ i independently of y i . Alice has no information on y ′ i . This means that the elements of the sets J 0 and J 1 are independent of c from Alice's point of view: their composition depends only on whether y ′ i = y i for a given i. Alice thus learns nothing from observing the sets J 0 and J 1 .
Note that Alice gains nothing from trying to delay her own boxes: By delaying boxes in the commitment protocol employed in step 2, she will only remain more ignorant about Bob's commitment. Furthermore, each round i in step 1 corresponds to Alice using an erasure channel with input v i = r y i ,i , because the following two conditions are satisfied: step 2 ensures us that Bob uses this channel, and, since Alice sends y i to Bob during step 3, Bob knows whether he obtained v i . The situation where Alice delays using the boxes is equivalent to using the channel with a randomly chosen input and gives her no additional advantage. Since we can construct an erasure channel, we thus obtain an 1-2 OT via the above construction [5] .
Security against Bob
Now suppose that Alice is honest, but Bob tries to learn more than s c . We now show that Bob can retrieve exactly one of the bits s 0 , s 1 . In particular, we also show that he cannot compute any function f of s 0 and s 1 which depends on both input bits. 1 Because Alice is honest, all v i are independent. Furthermore, since the sets J 0 and J 1 are disjoint, it follows that r = ⊕ j∈J 0 v j and r ′ = ⊕ j∈J 1 v j are independent. All Bob receives from Alice isŝ 0 = s 0 + r andŝ 1 = s 1 + r ′ . Thus, in order to compute any function f of s 0 , s 1 which depends on both input bits, Bob needs to learn both r and r ′ . Bob will only obtain r and r ′ and then also learn more than one of the bits s 0 , s 1 , if he succeeds in creating two sets
We are therefore interested in the probability that Bob can successfully construct two such sets.
In order to construct such sets, Bob may try to delay using some of the NL Boxes during step 1. This will enable him to wait for the announcement in step 3, to force y i = y ′ i and obtain v y i with certainty. By assumption, the bit commitment scheme is binding for sufficiently large k and thus Bob cannot try to fool Alice by breaking the commitment itself. However, he can try to commit to random values and escape detection during step 2. In particular, he can choose to be honest in step 1 for exactly one NL Box in runs i and n + i. Without loss of generality, suppose he was honest in run n + i and delayed use of the box in run i. He then commits once to the outcome of the honest box, and once to y ′ i = 1 and a random b i ∈ R {0, 1}. The probability that Alice challenges him on the box he has been honest with in step 1 is 1/2. Then he has succeeded to cheat on one of the bits, y ′ i , and will obtain v y i with certainty. However, with probability 1/2 Alice will challenge him on the other NL Box. In this case he can escape detection with probability 1/2: He announces y ′ i and b i and hopes that this matches the input of Alice's box. He will have committed to the correct b i with probability 1/2 and then he escapes detection. Thus the total probability of cheating successfully on one of the bits is given by 1/2 + (1/2)(1/2) = 3/4. Let C ⊆ [n] with k = |C|, 0 ≤ k ≤ n denote the set of indices on which Bob tries to deceive Alice. He will remain undetected with probability Pr(Bob successfully cheats on k bits) = 3 4
k .
Suppose now, Bob successfully cheated on k bits. We are then interested in bounding the probability of constructing two valid sets if Bob already has k valid entries. Note that we now only consider the probability of achieving y i = y ′ i for indices i / ∈ C and then #{i|y i = y ′ i } = (n − k) − S n−k . For k < n, If k = n, Bob will be caught with probability (3/4) n . Thus the probability of Bob deceiving Alice can be made arbitrarily small by choosing n large.
Conclusion and Open Questions
We have shown how to obtain protocols for bit commitment and one-out-of-two oblivious transfer given access to non-local boxes. This creates a link between cryptographic problems, which may appear very artificial, and non-local correlations: If such non-local boxes were available in nature, we could implement these cryptographic protocols securely which is known to be impossible to achieve using quantum mechanics alone.
Interestingly, the quantum mechanical impossibility proofs for bit commitment and coin tossing [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [12] via the so-called EPR-attack are the quantum version of delaying the input. One may want to go back to explore why we could circumvent this attack here, and the reason seems to be that the non-local box is more like a quantum mechanical entangled state together with an encasing experimental setup, which enforces that the particles can only be measured separately. In contrast, for the EPR-attack to work, Alice has to be able to perform arbitrary collective operations on her qubits.
